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Deterrence(¾ïÁö) ¡± ÀÇ °³³äÀ¸·Î ¹æ¾îüÁ¦ º¯È¯. ´É·Â(capability) - ÇÙ¹«±â ¹× Åõ¹ß¼ö´ÜÀÇ º¸À¯ ÀÇ»çÀü´Þ(communication) - ½ÇÁ¦Àû ´ëÀÀ ÀÇÁö ¹× ´É·ÂÀÇ Àü´Þ ÇÕ¸®¼º(rationality) - »ó´ëÀÇ ´É·ÂÀ» ÇÕ¸®ÀûÀ¸·Î ÆÇ´ÜÇϰí ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ Çൿ¿¡
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¥°. Çü¹úÀÇ ÀÇÀÇ Åë»óÀûÀ¸·Î Çü¹úÀ̶õ "¹üÁËÀÚ¿¡°Ô ±×°¡ ÇàÇÑ ¹üÇàÀ» ÀÌÀ¯·Î ±¹°¡°¡ ºÎ°úÇÏ´Â ÀÌÀ͹ÚÅ»Àû °­Á¦Á¶Ä¡"¶ó°í Á¤ÀǵȴÙ. Áï, Çü¹ú °³³äÀº 4°³ÀÇ ¿ä¼Ò·Î ÀÌ·ç¾îÁö´Âµ¥, ù°, ºÎ°ú ÁÖü°¡ ±¹°¡À̸ç, µÑ°, ºÎ°ú ´ë»óÀº ¹üÁËÀÚÀ̰í, ¼Â°, ºÎ°ú ±Ù°Å´Â ÀÌ
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¥°. µé¾î°¡¸ç Áö³­´Þ 27ÀÏ, °æÂû °Ë¹®À» ÇÇÇØ ´Þ¾Æ³ª´ø 10´ë ¼Ò³â 2¸íÀÌ ¼ûÁö¸é¼­ ½ÃÀÛµÈ ÀÌÈÄ ÇÁ¶û½ºÀÇ ¿©·¯ µµ½Ã¿¡¼­ µ¿½Ã´Ù¹ßÀûÀ¸·Î È®»êµÇ°í ÀÖ´Â ¼Ò¿ä »çÅ´ ¿­ÈêÀÌ ³Ñµµ·Ï ÁøÁ¤±â¹Ì¸¦ º¸ÀÌÁö ¾Ê°í ÀÖ´Ù. À̹ø »çÅ´ ¾ÆÇÁ¸®Ä«°è À̹ÎÀÚµéÀÇ 2¼¼ÀΠû¼Ò³âµéÀÌ
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[±¹Á¦°ü°è·Ð] ±¹Á¦Á¤Ä¡¿Í ÇÙ¹«±â [ÇöÀç⺸±â]
deterrence)À̶ó°í ÇÑ´Ù. ´Ù½Ã ¸»Çؼ­, ¾ïÁö¶ó´Â °³³äÀº ¡°ÀüÀïÀ» ÅëÇØ¼­ ¾òÀ¸·Á´Â ÀÌÀͺ¸´Ù ÀüÀï¿¡¼­ ÀÔ°Ô µÉ ÇÇÇØ°¡ ´õ Å©´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» »ó´ë¹æ¿¡ È®½Å½ÃÄÑ ÀüÀïÀ» Æ÷±âÇÏ°Ô ¸¸µå´Â ÇàÀ§¸¦ ¸»ÇÑ´Ù. ºê·Îµð¶ó´Â ÇÐÀÚ´Â ÇÙ»ç¿ëÀÇ ´ë°¡¸¦ ÁöºÒÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ¸·Á°í ÇÑ´Ù¸é ±× À¯ÀÏ
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[¹Ì±¹´ë¿ÜÁ¤Ã¥] U.S. security policy & Role of USFK [ÇöÀç⺸±â]
deterrence¡¯ toward the Communist bloc and took their national security interest seriously. But after the end of cold war, they mapped out the ¡®Strategy of Engagement¡¯ and Enlargement to communist countries and placed their economic interest to pr
US
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Çмú³í¹® (627)
 
Deterrence and Public Policy: Trade-offs in the Allocation of Police Resources [ÇöÀç⺸±â]

Çмú³í¹® > »çȸ°úÇÐ > °æÁ¦ÇÐ > Çѱ¹±¹Á¦°æÁ¦ÇÐȸ µ¿°èÇмú¹ßÇ¥³í¹®Áý -
Feeding deterrence of Reticulitermes speratus on the Wood decayed by a brown rot fungus Fibroporia radiculosa [ÇöÀç⺸±â]

Çмú³í¹® > °øÇÐ > Åä¸ñ°øÇÐ > Çѱ¹¸ñÀç°øÇÐ Çмú¹ßÇ¥³í¹®Áý -
JAPANESE NUCLEAR DETERRENT ? [ÇöÀç⺸±â]

Çмú³í¹® > »çȸ°úÇÐ > Á¤Ä¡/¿Ü±³ÇÐ > ASIAN PERSPECTIVE -
Unholy Trinity in Nuclear Deterrence: Three Dilemmas of Nuclear Weapons [ÇöÀç⺸±â]

Nuclear deterrence has been an issue of great policy relevance these days, but there are few works about its mechanism in the new century. This paper explores various aspects in nuclear de...
Çмú³í¹® > »çȸ°úÇÐ > Á¤Ä¡/¿Ü±³ÇÐ > The Korean Journal of Security Affairs (KJSA) -
The Comparison Of Entry Deterrence Between Cournot And Bertrand Competition [ÇöÀç⺸±â]

Çмú³í¹® > »çȸ°úÇÐ > °æÁ¦ÇÐ > The Korean Economic Review -
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of, À§¿øÈ¸, and, Weapons, for, Pacific, ¹«±â, ±ÝÁö, Á¶¾à, Asia
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