[졸업] 미국의 대북한 인식관료정치그리고 동맹이 북핵위기에 미친영향: 1993년 1차 북핵위기와 2002년 2차 북핵위기를 중심으로

다운로드: 미국의 대북한 인식.관료정치.그리고 동맹이 북핵위기에 미친영향.pdf

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차 례 그림차례 ··································································································································· 3 표 차 례 ··································································································································· 3 국 문 요 약 ····························································································································· 4 제1장 서 론 ··························································································································· 1 1.1 문제제기 ························································································································ 1 1.2 연구방법 ························································································································ 4 제2장 이론적 논의와 분석 틀 ····························································································· 7 2.1 미국외교정책결정의 일반적 구조 ············································································ 7 2.1.1 인식과 외교정책 ··································································································· 7 2.1.2 국내정치와 외교정책 ························································································· 10 2.1.3 국외정치와 외교정책 ························································································· 13 2.2 국제관계에서 북핵의 의미 ······················································································ 16 2.3 이론적 배경과 분석 틀 ···························································································· 26 제3장 1차 북핵위기와 클린턴 정부의 외교정책 ··························································· 37 3.1 개 관 ·························································································································· 37 3.2 클린턴 정부의 1차 북핵위기에 대한 외교정책결정요인 ·································· 43 3.2.1 클린턴 정부의 북한에 대한 인식 ··································································· 43 3.2.2 클린턴 정부의 관료정치 ··················································································· 47 3.2.3 1차 북핵위기와 한국?일본?중국?러시아 ················································· 53 3.3 1차 북핵위기와 클린턴 정부의 외교정책의 일관성 ·········································· 59 3.3.1 북한과의 강한 협상의지 ··················································································· 59 3.3.2 협상의 타결 ········································································································· 64 3.3.3 일관성 있는 외교정책 ······················································································· 70 3.4 평 가 ·························································································································· 80 제4장 2차 북핵위기와 부시 정부의 외교정책 ······························································· 84 4.1 개 관 ·························································································································· 84 4.2 부시정부의 2차 북핵위기에 대한 외교정책결정요인 ········································ 93 4.2.1 부시정부의 북한에 대한 인식 ········································································· 93 4.2.2 부시정부의 관료정치 ························································································· 95 4.2.3 2차 북핵위기와 한국?일본?중국?러시아 ··············································· 103 4.3 2차 북핵위기와 부시 정부의 외교정책의 비일관성 ········································ 110 4.3.1. 북한과의 약한 협상의지 ················································································· 110 4.3.2. 협상의 지연 ······································································································· 115 4.3.3. 일관성 없는 외교정책 ····················································································· 119 4.4 평 가 ························································································································ 130 제5장 결 론 ······················································································································· 134 참고문헌 ······························································································································· 139 부 록 ······························································································································· 155 ABSTRACT ························································································································ 174

본문내용

클린턴 정부는 북한의 핵개발 수위를 정확히 판단할 수 없기 때문에 손실을 최소화하고자 현상유지 정책을 추진하였다. 1차 북핵위기가 발발했을 때 클린턴 정부의 어조는 강경했다. 그러나 클린턴 정부는 미국의 실익이 군사제재의 모험보다는 대화를 통한 북한과의 합의라고 보았기 때문에 점차 협상을 통한 문제해결의 의도가 부각되었다. 북한에 대한 인식, 미국의 국내 관료정치, 그리고 동북아 동맹국가들에 대한 고려는 클린턴 정부로 하여금 일관된 협상을 통한 외교정책으로 이끌었다. 이와 같은 클린턴 정부의 협상외교는 1차 북핵위기 동안 일관성 있게 추진되었고, 북한은 이러한 미국의 의지를 받아들임으로써 양국 모두 만족스러운 결과를 얻은 것으로 판단된다. 부시 정부는 클린턴 정부의 유화적인 대응방식으로 인해 북한에게 핵문제에 대한 주도권을 뺏기고, 핵개발의 빌미를 제공했다고 보았다. 따라서 부시 정부는 확고하고 지속적인 강경책이 북한을 변화시키는데 보다 효과적이라고 판단하였다. 부시 정부는 그동안 개최되었던 3자 회담과 1차?2차 6자 회담을 통해 북한에게 주도권을 양보할 의사가 없다는 것을 명백히 하고, 북한이 핵문제를 통해 경제적인 지원을 얻고자 하는 태도를 바꾸지 않는다면 군사제재도 고려할 수 있다는 입장을 확고히 하였다. 1차 북핵위기시 북한의 보상외교와는 달리 부시 정부는 2차 북핵위기를 통해 미국이 대화의 주도권을 잡고 북한에게 역보상외교를 요구하고 있다. 하지만 부시 정부의 북한에 대한 무리한 요구는 오히려 회담의 협상력을 떨어뜨리는 결과를 초래하고 있다. 부시 정부가 2차 북핵위기에서 대북한 외교의 목표는 1차 북핵위기처럼 현상유지가 아니라 이번 위기를 계기로 핵개발이 근절되기를 바라고 있는것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 제네바협정을 어겼다는 북한에 대한 부정적 인식과 강경한 의지와 협상의지가 혼재하는 미국 관료정치의 혼선, 그리고 북한에 대해서 군사제재를 원하지 않는 한국, 일본, 중국, 러시아 등 동북아 동맹국가들과의 의견조율 실패 등이 부시 정부의 북핵정책의 일관성을 잃게 만들고 있다. 따라서 부시정부 하에서 현재 진행 중인 미북회담은 일관성 없는 정치?경제?군사정책으로 인해 장기적인 양상이 될 것으로 예상된다.